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A Preference for Equality: Seeking the Benefits of
Diversity Outside the Educational Context
David A. Harvey
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has accepted diversity1 as a compelling
governmental interest justifying the use of race-conscious affirmative
action plans (“AAP”) in the educational context.2 Therefore, an
admissions program that takes race into account to obtain a diverse
student body may be constitutional under the Court’s strict scrutiny
analysis.3 Recognizing diversity’s impact in the educational setting, the
Court has found the benefits of diversity to be real and substantial.4 Yet
these benefits are not limited solely to the formal educational setting.5 On
the contrary, the benefits from exposure to diversity continue through
one’s life and spill into society as well.6 Numerous scholars, social and
1. As used, “diversity” retains its general definition: “1. a. The fact or quality of being
diverse; difference. b. A point or respect in which things differ. 2. Variety or multiformity.”
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 527 (4th ed. 2000). It should be
noted that this paper emphasizes the consideration of race and ethnicity as available indicators of the
fact or quality of being a diverse person. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
3. Id.; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228–29 (1995) (citing
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (explaining the point of
strict scrutiny in racial classifications as follows:
The point of carefully examining the interest asserted by the government in support of a
racial classification, and the evidence offered to show that the classification is needed, is
precisely to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of race in governmental
decisionmaking . . . Strict scrutiny does not “treat dissimilar race-based decisions as
though they were equally objectionable[.]” [T]o the contrary, it evaluates carefully all
governmental race-based decisions in order to decide which are constitutionally
objectionable and which are not. By requiring strict scrutiny of racial classifications, we
require courts to make sure that a governmental classification based on race, which “so
seldom provide[s] a relevant basis for disparate treatment,” is legitimate, before
permitting unequal treatment based on race to proceed)).
4. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–31.
5. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (quoting United States
v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)) (noting the essential need for our future
leaders to be exposed to diversity).
6. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (citing to numerous Amici attesting to the benefits of diversity
outside the educational context and their continued benefits to society).
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psychological researchers, military officials, businesses, and professional
entities agree that the benefits from diversity are essential for growth and
success.7 But for some anomalous reason, diversity, as a compelling
governmental interest, has only been constitutionally approved for a
relatively brief period of an individual’s life—during his or her formal
education—and
then
only
through
preferential
race-based
classifications.8
Outside of education and preferential race-based admissions policies,
the federal government has sought to remedy harm caused by past
governmental discrimination through AAPs.9 Previously, any federal
AAP that used racial classifications had to pass constitutional review
under an intermediate scrutiny standard,10 whereas a state AAP was
subject to the highest level of review— strict scrutiny.11 In reviewing
federal AAPs, the Court formerly gave deference to Congress pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment’s provision that Congress has the power to
enforce the Equal Protection clause in relation to the states.12 But
recently, the Court has limited this deference to Congress, overruling a
line of cases to the contrary,13 and has begun applying strict scrutiny
7. Id.; see also Brief of American Sociological Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, at 22–24, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241); Brief of American
Psychological Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 30, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516); Brief of BP America Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, at 1–7, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516); Brief of 3M,
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 5–12, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(No. 01-1447).
8. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306. These AAPs are sometimes referred to as preferential AAPs
because preference is given to an applicant’s race or ethnicity.
9. See Small Business Act of 1953 § 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 637 (2006); Surface Transportation
Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424; Daniel Levinson, A Study of Preferential Treatment:
The Evolution of Minority Business Enterprise Assistance Programs, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 61
(1980); see also Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965) (requiring provisions for
nondiscrimination in all public contracts. The Executive issued this mandate absent explicit
congressional approval, discretion, or legislation); Note, Exec. Order No. 11246: AntiDiscrimination Obligations in Government Contracts, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590 (1969). Because of
their remedial nature, these AAPs are sometimes referred to as remedial AAPs.
10. Intermediate scrutiny requires satisfaction of a two-prong test: (1) a significant
governmental interest, and (2) a narrowly tailored plan to further that interest. Likewise, strict
scrutiny requires satisfaction of a two-prong test that is the strictest standard of review: 1) a
compelling governmental interest, and (2) a narrowly tailored plan to further that interest. Adarand,
515 U.S. at 235, 237.
11. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (applying intermediate review to a federally
mandated AAP); Metro Broad., Inc., v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). But see City
of Cleburne, Texas, v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–42 (1985) (discussing the
Court’s standard of review where racial classifications are used by the government); Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to a state AAP).
12. Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448 (granting deference to Congress in the Court’s review of its
legislation); Metro Broad., 497 U.S. 547.
13. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. 547 (upholding a federally-mandated AAP awarding new
radio and television licenses to minority-controlled firms while applying intermediate scrutiny and
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across the board for all federal and state race-based classifications.14 This
has placed substantial burdens on federal AAPs and their ability to pass
constitutional review. As a result, the overarching goal of AAPs—
societal progress in achieving racial and ethnic equality—has been
impaired substantially and may even be regressing.15
Whether seeking to remedy past governmental discrimination or
seeking to obtain a diverse student body, AAPs have the same purpose:
to cure societal ills of prejudice, discrimination, and other forms of racial
and ethnic inequality.16 A superficial review of constitutional challenges
to remedial and preferential AAPs leads to a noteworthy hypothesis with
regard to remedial programs: AAPs justified, and subsequently defended,
on remedial grounds are failing.17 This may be attributable to the Court’s
substantial evidentiary requirement that the government prove past
governmental discrimination to employ race-conscious, remedial AAPs,
as well as the Court’s heightened review of them.18 As a result, the
remedial argument is losing its efficacy.19 Furthermore, the changing
make-up of the Court has left the continuance of the Court’s previous
trend in question.20
Legal scholars have detailed the Court’s amorphous positions on
AAPs and some have argued to extend diversity as a compelling
governmental interest to other specific contexts.21 However, legal
distinguishing between constitutional review of a state and federal AAP); Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448
(upholding the constitutionality of a federal AAP requiring at least 10 percent of federal funds for
local public works be used to procure services or supplies from minority business enterprises).
14. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (overruling Fullilove and Metro
Broad. as far as each applies a lower standard of review to governmental racial classifications
without considering the question of how much deference Congress is entitled to in enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment).
15. See Brief of American Sociological Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, at 3–4, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) (noting that Blacks in
major U.S. cities are presently almost as segregated as Blacks were living under apartheid in South
Africa while presenting other alarming statistical data on the previous condition versus the present
condition).
16. See Orrin Finch, Minority and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Requirements in
Public Contracting, Transportation Research Board, RRD No. 146 (1985) and supplement, LRD No.
25 (1992); Brief of American Sociological Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at
3–4; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241, 02-516); Brief of American
Psychological Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 30.
17. See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 200.
18. See id.
19. See id.; cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Mineta, 532 U.S. 967 (2001) (approving
certiorari in part); Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) (dismissing certiorari
as improvidently granted).
20. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring) (commenting that “it is
unlikely, if not impossible, that the challenged program would survive under this understanding of
strict scrutiny, but I am content to leave that to be decided on remand”).
21. See Orrin Finch, Minority and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Requirements in
Public Contracting, Transportation Research Board, RRD No. 146 (1985) and supplement, LRD No.
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scholars have yet to explore the use of a compelling governmental
interest in seeking the societal benefits from racial and ethnic diversity,
widely recognized in the educational context, as a justification for
broader-reaching affirmative action programs.
Because the benefits that flow from diversity outside the educational
context have been established as equally extensive and desirable as those
that flow from within the educational context,22 the government has a
compelling interest in seeking diversity outside the educational context
as well. These benefits outside the educational context are likely to be
greater than those in the educational context.23 If so, this makes diversity
an even more compelling governmental interest. As addressed in Parts II
and III, the similar purposes of preferential and remedial AAPs are better
served by designing plans that use race-based classifications to obtain the
benefits of diversity. If faced with a constitutional challenge, the
government would be better served to defend the constitutionality on
preferential grounds, arguing that the benefits from diversity justify the
preferential AAP, rather than on remedial grounds.
II. THE INS AND THE OUTS OF REMEDIAL AND PREFERENTIAL
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: CHANGES IN THE SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE IN AND OUT OF THE EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause guarantees
‘equal protection’ to all citizens and forbids the states from encroaching
on this right.24 Challenges to AAPs in the educational and federal context
have generally been litigated by invoking this clause.25 Section five of
the Fourteenth Amendment states that “[t]he Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”26
25 (1992); Andrew H. Baida, Civil Rights in Transportation Projects, Transportation Research
Board, RRD No. 48 (2003); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481
(2004); Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975 (2004); Athena S. Cheng,
Affirmative Action for the Female Entrepreneur: Gender as a Presumed Socially Disadvantaged
Group for 8(a) Program Purposes, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 185 (2001).
22. See infra Part III.
23. See id.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see City of Cleburne, Texas. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 440–42 (1985) (discussing equal protection and applicable standards of review when
encroached).
25. See e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (applying the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment only to the states, to the federal government, as well as the Fifth
Amendment); see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Metro Broad., Inc., v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 497 U.S. 547
(1990); Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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Historically, the Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny when
faced with constitutional challenges to federal AAPs, arguably
interpreting the grant of power to Congress broadly.27 However, the
Supreme Court in a recent case applied strict scrutiny to all race-based
classifications by the government without addressing the degree of
deference the legislative branch is entitled to by the courts when
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause.28
Since 1978, when the first AAP case appeared before the Supreme
Court, only three cases on educational AAPs and three cases on federal
employment AAPs have been argued before the Justices.29 But three
decades later, the Court has yet to articulate clear, applicable standards
for federal AAPs designed to remedy past governmental discrimination.30
In the federal employment context, the Court upheld the two early
federal AAPs in Fullilove v. Klutznick and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Commission, and remanded the third, in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, for further proceedings. In the
educational context, the Court found two of the three AAPs—in
University of California v. Bakke and Gratz v. Bollinger—
unconstitutional, leaving for future cases an uncertain precedent. In all
AAP cases, decisions have been delivered by a divided and contentious
Court.
Interestingly, Metro Broadcasting was upheld not only on the ground
that it sought to remedy past discrimination, but also because it sought to
promote broadcast diversity, which the Court held to be an important
governmental objective passing intermediate constitutional review.31
Because no federal AAP case has been brought before the Court
asserting diversity as the sole justification for racial preferences, one may
wonder to what extent diversity impacted the Court’s decisions in Metro

27. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448; Metro Broad., 497 U.S. 547.
28. See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 231.
29. Education cases: Bakke, 438 U.S. 265; Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
Federal AAPs cases: Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448; Metro Broad., 497 U.S. 547; Adarand, 515 U.S. 200.
30. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (overruling a line of cases
applying intermediate scrutiny to federal AAPs and remanding the case accordingly); compare
Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Mineta, 532 U.S. 967 (2001) (accepting a second petition for writ of
certiorari and limiting the petition to (1) whether the court of appeals misapplied the strict scrutiny
standard in determining if Congress had a compelling interest to enact legislation designed to
remedy the effects of racial discrimination and (2) whether the United States Department of
Transportation’s current Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest) with Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001)
(dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted). Unfortunately, the Court dismissed the case,
leaving the issue in arguably more of a mess than before it decided Adarand Constructors, Inc., v.
Pena.
31. 497 U.S. at 566 (noting the limited nature of broadcast frequencies and finding that
broadcast diversity was an important governmental interest).
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Broadcasting and whether diversity presents a sufficient basis to satisfy
constitutional demands before an arguably more conservative judiciary
applying strict scrutiny review. According to the majority in Adarand, it
does not seem likely.32 However, considering Grutter v. Bollinger and its
amici,33 a preferential AAP justified on only the benefits of diversity
gains vitality and may prevail under strict scrutiny review.
The reasoning of the Metro Broadcasting decision is distinguishable
from the argument presented here in a significant way: Metro
Broadcasting dealt with remedial measures along with preferential race
treatment justified by an important governmental interest.34 The
argument advanced here, however, considers only the use of preferential
treatment without any remedial measures. As illustrated below, the
Court’s jurisprudence has become less amenable to remedial AAPs and,
as a result, the remedial argument’s vitality has been diminished. In
contrast, the argument for the use of preferential, race-conscious AAPs to
obtain the benefits of diversity has now emerged as a potentially viable
constitutional justification in light of recent cases.
In Bakke, the Court dismissed all arguments advanced by the
University of California, Davis to justify race-conscious AAPs in
remedying past racial discrimination; instead, the Court only accepted
the justification of diversity.35 As a result, the Court did not require the
state to prove past governmental discrimination before it accepted the
University’s interest in seeking diversity by using race-conscious
classifications 36 This illustrates a key difference between remedial and
preferential AAPs: the first remedies a past constitutional violation by
inflicting another constitutional violation on “innocent wrongdoers,”
while the other simply seeks the benefits of diversity by using
preferential race treatment. In the latter, the value of all races is equated
and preferential race treatment is used for the benefit of all races.
The following section analyzes the remedial federal affirmative
action cases. It begins with the most recently decided case in light of the
previous two cases it overruled, detailing the Court’s deteriorating
acceptance of AAPs that seek to remedy past governmental
discrimination. From there, the classroom-setting cases are analyzed
chronologically, examining the Court’s increasing acceptance of AAPs
that seek diversity in education.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

515 U.S. at 225–27.
539 U.S. 306.
See supra note 31.
438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978).
See infra note 89.
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A. The Federal Remedial Affirmative Action Cases Outside the
Educational Context: Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena in light of
Fullilove v. Klutznick and Metro Broadcasting, Inc., v. Federal
Communications Commission
In Adarand, the Central Federal Lands Highway Division, a part of
the United States Department of Transportation (“DOT”), awarded a
prime contract for a highway construction project to the Colorado
Mountain Gravel & Construction company (“CMGC”).37 After being
awarded the contract, CMGC solicited bids for a guardrail portion of the
contract to subcontractors, awarding the bid to Gonzales Construction
Company.38 Gonzales Construction was certified as a Small Business
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals under
the Small Business Act (“SBA”). CMGC awarded the subcontract to
Gonzales over the lowest bidder, Adarand.39
Pursuant to a complex federal scheme based on the Surface
Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987
(STURAA),40 a DOT appropriations measure, and the SBA,41 the prime
contract’s terms provided that CMGC would receive additional monetary
compensation if it hired subcontractors certified as small businesses
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged owners.42 The
record indicates that this incentive controlled why CMGC hired
Gonzales over Adarand.43 The SBA required most federal agency
contracts to contain a compensation clause as well as a clause stating that
“[t]he contractor shall presume that socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic
Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other
minorities, or any other individual found to be disadvantaged by the
Administration pursuant to section 8(a) of the Small Business Act.”44
37. 515 U.S. at 205.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.; see Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 10017, 101 Stat. 132, 145 (1982) (stating not less than ten percent of the appropriated funds shall be
expended with small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals, adopting the Small Business Act’s definitions of socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals); see also Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation
Assistance Act § 106(c)(2)(B) (adding the presumption that women, along with certain racial groups,
shall be presumed to be socially and economically disadvantaged individuals for purposes of this
subsection).
41. Small Business Act of 1953, 15 U.S.C. § 631 (2006).
42. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205.
43. Id.
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(C)(ii); see also Small Business Act of 1953 (hereinafter
“SBA”), Pub. L. No. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384, §124.105(b)(1) (permitting a presumption that members

64

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 21

Because of this requirement, Adarand asserted his Fifth Amendment
Equal Protection rights, claiming that this presumption discriminated on
the basis of race and violated his constitutional guarantee.45 The question
of what standard of review to apply to the race-conscious federal AAP
confronted the Court here for only the third time.
Fullilove v. Klutznick came before the Supreme Court in 1980 and
challenged a federal AAP for the first time.46 The Court upheld a
federally mandated 10-percent set-aside program for minority owned
businesses under the Public Works Employment Act of 1977.47 Chief
Justice Burger’s plurality opinion stated that “[a]ny preference based on
racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching
examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional
guarantees,”48 and rejected the standards of review articulated in the
University of California Regents v. Bakke.49 However, Justice Powell
stated in his opinion in Fullilove that the AAP would have passed
judicial review under any of the several tests articulated in Bakke and
that the plurality opinion had essentially applied strict scrutiny correctly
as described in Bakke.50 In Adarand, the majority made explicit “what
Justice Powell thought implicit in the Fullilove lead opinion” – that strict
scrutiny applies to federal racial classifications. 51 Because the plurality
opinion in Fullilove did not state the standard of review applied, the
Court in Adarand acknowledged that Fullilove would be overruled
insofar as it supports a lower standard of review, contrary to the Court’s
of the listed groups and others listed by the administration are socially disadvantaged small
businesses controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals). But see SBA,
§123.105(c) (allowing individuals not classified in any group to prove social disadvantage on the
basis of clear and convincing evidence and economic disadvantage according to the requirements of
§124.106); SBA, §8(d), 124.106(b) (termed “subcontracting program,” presumes social disadvantage
based on membership in a certain minority group and requires showing of economic disadvantage);
48 C.F.R. §§19.001, 19.703(a)(2) (1994) (permitting members of minority groups that want to
participate in the 8(d) subcontracting program entitlement to a race-based presumption of social and
economic disadvantage); CFR §§124.111(c)–(d), 124.601–124.609 (1994) (allowing a third party to
produce evidence that participants in either the 8(a) or (d) programs are not economically or socially
disadvantaged).
45. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205–06.
46. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
47. Id.
48. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491 (articulating a standard distinct from strict scrutiny test—
compelling governmental interests, narrowly tailored to advance those interests—applied in Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke).
49. Id. at 492 (citing Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (discussed below)).
50. Id. at 496. Justice Stewart wrote a dissent joined by then-Justice Rehnquist averring that
the standard applied here to the federal government differed from the one applied to the state in
Bakke. Id. at 522–32.
51. 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (noting that Justice Powell thought the standard of review was
that of strict scrutiny and then acknowledging that Fullilove is overruled insofar as it supports a
lower standard of review).
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decision in 1990.52
Five years before Adarand and ten years after Fullilove, the Court
dealt with another Fifth Amendment challenge to a federal AAP in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.53 The Court faced benign race-conscious
measures mandated by Congress and held that
[B]enign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress—even if
those measures are not ‘remedial’ in the sense of being designed to
compensate victims of past governmental or societal discrimination—
are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important
governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.54

The Court also noted “[the standard of review articulated] in Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co. concerning a minority set-aside program adopted by a
municipality, does not prescribe the level of scrutiny to be applied to a
benign racial classification employed by Congress.”55 The Court
acknowledged a distinction between municipality and congressionally
mandated remedial AAPs and the appropriate standard of review for
each. The AAP in Metro Broadcasting awarded licenses and benefits to
minority owners and served not only as a remedy for past discrimination,
but also served an important governmental interest in promoting
broadcast diversity. The Court found that the AAP passed constitutional
review under intermediate scrutiny because it served an important
governmental objective and its policies were substantially related to
achieving the interest.56
The Court in Adarand found two problems with applying
intermediate scrutiny to congressionally mandated benign racial
classifications such as those in Metro Broadcasting. First, the Court
claimed it contradicted the Court’s reasoning in Croson. There the Court
had asserted that strict scrutiny of all governmental racial classifications
is essential, stating:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such racebased measures, there is simply no way of determining what
classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in

52. Id. The Court did not decide whether Fullilove had applied a lower standard of review or,
if so, whether the federal AAP would have past strict scrutiny review.
53. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
54. Id. at 564–565.
55. Id. (emphasis supplied).
56. Id. at 566–569.
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fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple
racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen ‘fit’ this compelling
goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for
the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.57

Second, the Court found that Metro Broadcasting rejected three
general propositions established from prior equal protection cases: 1)
congruence with the standards applicable to the federal and state racebased classifications, 2) skepticism of all race-based classifications, and
3) consistency of treatment irrespective of the race benefited or
burdened.58 Yet, the Adarand Court did not distinguish between federal
and state affirmative action cases even though each invoked a separate
constitutional amendment. Instead, the majority opinion found a general
congruence between the standards applied to federal and state race-based
classifications despite the different textual requirements set out by the
Constitution.59 The Court justified the proposition of skepticism of all
race-based classifications by citing its previous jurisprudence, which
detailed the ills and dangers of racial classifications.60 Under any
analysis, Metro Broadcasting’s application of intermediate scrutiny to a
federally-mandated AAP could not stand according to the majority in
Adarand.61 Thus, the Court overruled Metro Broadcasting in its
entirety.62
Metro Broadcasting provided little guidance for the Court in
Adarand. And Fullilove’s soundness remains questionable as it is no
longer controlling insofar as it suggests a lower standard of review than
strict scrutiny in cases involving federal racial-based classifications.63 As
57. Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (citing Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
58. See Id. at 226–27 (additionally noting that those propositions derive from the basic
principles of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to protect persons, not groups). But see id. at 247
(pointing out the fact that the court employs two different standards for gender discrimination and
racial discrimination).
59. Id. at 226–29.
60. Id. at 231–32.
61. Id. at 225–27.
62. Id. As noted by Justice Stevens in Metro Broadcasting, the Court seemingly blurred the
differences between state and federal government race-based initiatives. See id. at 229–30 (Justice
Stevens alleged that the Court did not distinguish between the federal and State legislatures). Justice
Stevens, who once aligned himself with the conservative Justices, highlighted the difference between
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the power granted to Congress by the Constitution to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause against the states. Id. at 228–29.
63. Id. at 235.
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pointed out, Justice Burger’s opinion did not articulate a standard of
review as the Court had in subsequent cases;64 nonetheless, Justice
Powell acknowledged that the same result would follow regardless of
which standard of review from Bakke was applied.65 As a result, the
court found it unnecessary to decide whether Fullilove would survive
strict scrutiny as set out under Adarand, leaving its holding dangling by a
legal thread.66
After articulating the correct standard of review to be applied in all
federal, race-conscious AAPs, the Court in Adarand vacated and
remanded the case, leaving for the lower court the question of whether
there was a compelling governmental interest and whether the means
were narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.67 On remand, it became
apparent that the Court’s clarification was anything but clear. Adarand
has worked its way back up to the Supreme Court, now spanning the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries.68
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia stated:
In my view, government can never have a ‘compelling interest’ in
discriminating on the basis of race in order to ‘make up’ for past racial
discrimination in the opposite direction. Individuals who have been
wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; but
under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or
a debtor race. That concept is alien to the Constitution’s focus upon the
individual, and its rejection of dispositions based on race, or based on
blood. To pursue the concept of racial entitlement—even for the most
admirable and benign of purposes—is to reinforce and preserve for
future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race
privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one
race here. It is American. It is unlikely, if not impossible, that the
challenged program would survive under this understanding of strict
scrutiny, but I am content to leave that to be decided on remand.69

This view effectively denies any deference to Congress in cases where

64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980)).
66. Id. at 235.
67. Id. at 237–38.
68. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 532 U.S. 967 (2001).
69. Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (arguably a much broader
position than need be—a slippery slope argument). Justice O’Connor “announced the judgment of
the Court and delivered an opinion with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, III-D, and IV, which is for
the Court except insofar as it might be inconsistent with the views expressed in Justice Scalia’s
concurrence, and an opinion with respect to Part III-C in which Justice Kennedy joins.” Id. at 204.
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enforcing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
serves to inflict an additional injury on another race.70 But neither
Justice Scalia nor Justice O’Connor addressed whether Congress was
entitled to deference under the constitutional amendment, leaving much
confusion and ambiguity as to what are permissible race-based
classifications and what are not.71
The Court rejected the government’s argument that the
subcontracting compensation clause program was based on disadvantage
and not race, but agreed with the government’s statement of law—race
neutral regulations and statutes require only an intermediate level of
scrutiny.72 However, this case involved explicit race-based classifications
without facially race-neutral laws that result in a racially disproportionate
impact.73 This added comment might operate as a backdoor escape for
invalidating race-neutral laws that disproportionately impact one group
over another.
Adarand changed the landscape of federal AAPs. It heightened the
standard of review for all race-based AAPs while leaving open the
question of what amount of deference owed to Congress. If Congress is
entitled to deference, then the Court may decrease some of the
evidentiary burden of finding past governmental discrimination before
sanctioning remedial AAPs. But as Justice Scalia averred,74 it may be
impossible for AAPs to pass strict scrutiny where they seek to impose
another constitutional violation on those not involved in the prior
discrimination. However, it may be possible to pass strict scrutiny where
the AAPs seek to equate the races and actualize the benefits of diversity
for the benefit of all, regardless of race.

70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
71. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 231.
72. Id. at 212–13.
73. See id. at 213 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
74. See supra note 20.
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B. Preferential Affirmative Action Cases in the Educational Context:
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Gratz v. Bollinger, and
Grutter v. Bollinger
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,75 the University
claimed its AAP was justified on several different grounds.76 However,
the Court only found one of its arguments valid,77 which paved the way
for the future AAPs and arguments.78 Bakke has served as the touchstone
case supporting both a state’s assertion that diversity is a compelling
governmental interest, which would permit consideration of a person’s
race and ethnicity in admissions decisions, and the claim that this use
may be narrowly tailored to pass constitutional scrutiny. Because no
opinion in Bakke garnered a majority,79 courts have since struggled with
the authoritative weight of Justice Powell’s finding that diversity may
use race or ethnicity to serve a compelling governmental interest in a
narrowly tailored way. Twenty-five years later and in the wake of a split
in the circuits,80 the Court heard two factually similar cases where the
state attempted to emulate the admissions program described in Justice
Powell’s opinion.81 Although the Court came to two different
conclusions, it became clear that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke could
serve as a constitutionally permissible guide for allowing the
consideration of race and ethnicity as a “plus factor” in order to serve the
compelling governmental interest of diversity in the educational
context.82 In all three cases, the Court recognized the benefits of a
diverse education, including robust commerce,83 democracy,84 and the
75. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
76. See id. at 289–315 (considering the arguments that whites are not a discrete and insular
minority entitling them to a higher standard of review; that the discrimination is permissible because
it is benign; that a lower scrutiny should apply as it did in school desegregation, employment
discrimination, and sex discrimination; that discrimination favoring racial or ethnic minorities has
received judicial approval without an exacting inquiry; and that the state has an interest in
ameliorating or eliminating the effects of past discrimination, helping those whom the school finds
to be victims of societal discrimination, improving the medical care to underserved communities, or
attaining a diverse student body).
77. Id. at 320.
78. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
79. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Gratz, 539 U.S. 244.
80. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). But see Smith v. Univ. of Wash.
Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000).
81. Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, with Gratz, 539 U.S. 244.
82. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
83. See id. at 330 (quoting Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, at 5, Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1447)).
84. Id. at 331 (stating that education has long been held to be pivotal to our political system
(quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221, (1982))); id. at 332 (acknowledging that law schools
breed future leaders and the importance of diversity in those institutions (quoting Sweatt v. Painter,
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health and well-being of society.85
1. A case of first impression: Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke
From 1969 to 1970, the University of California at Davis (hereinafter
“UC Davis”) began to implement an admissions program which included
the consideration of race and ethnicity.86 In 1974, Bakke challenged the
constitutionality of this program.87 In response to Bakke’s suit, UC Davis
asserted diversity as a justification for its use of race and ethnicity in its
admissions program.88 When the case arrived at the Supreme Court of
the United States, it presented a case of first impression, which may
explain the six separate opinions, none of which served as the majority
opinion of the Court. The only holding for the Court in Bakke was that a
“State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a
properly devised admissions program involving the competitive
consideration of [a person’s] race and ethnic origin.”89 Justice Powell’s
opinion elaborated on the parameters of such a program.90
The admissions program at UC Davis set aside a number of spots in
each year’s class for members of certain minority groups.91 More
specifically, UC Davis created a separate admissions program altogether
for disadvantaged students who belonged to certain minority groups with
the goal of increasing their numbers in each year’s class.92 UC Davis
defined disadvantaged students from “economically and/or educationally
disadvantaged backgrounds,” and permitted applicants to identify
themselves as a member of these categories.93 Applicants could also elect

339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950))).
85. Id. at 331 (stating education provides the basis of good citizenry (quoting Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954))).
86. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272–73 (1978). Bakke challenged the
program on three grounds: the California Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 270; see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7
(stating “[n]o special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered,
revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted
privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens”); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(d) (stating “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
87. Bakke, 438 U.S at 277–78.
88. Id. at 279.
89. See id. at 320; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322–23 (2003).
90. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265–326.
91. Id. at 269–70.
92. Id. at 272–73.
93. Id. at 273, n. 1.
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to be considered as members of certain minority groups, which were
limited to Blacks, Chicanos, Asians, or American Indians.94 Both the
general and disadvantaged admissions programs were administered by
UC Davis in the same way except that the GPA requirements were not in
effect for the minority students.95
The Court found the use of race by UC Davis permissible insofar as
it sought the attainment of a diverse student body.96 With this argument
asserted, Justice Powell’s opinion addressed the benefits that arise from
diversity, stating that “[t]he Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection.’”97 Further substantiating this point, a President
of Princeton University stated that diversity leads to “[a] great deal of
learning occur[ring] informally” and to the understanding that “[p]eople
do not learn very much when they are surrounded only by the likes of
themselves.”98
Justice Powell’s opinion framed the goal of seeking a diverse student
body as relating to the First Amendment and of “paramount importance
in the fulfillment” of universities’ missions.99 While briefly
acknowledging the possibility that the goal of diversity may have
“greater force” at the undergraduate level, the Court cited Sweatt v.
Painter100 and discussed how critical diversity was at the graduate level,
particularly in the legal and medical fields.101 Ethnicity, however, was
only one of many factors Justice Powell cited in describing a model
program.102 As will be seen in the following two cases, twenty-five years
after Bakke, the consideration of race and ethnic origin may not be a
predominant factor in admissions so as to operate as a quota.

94. Id. at 274 (citation omitted).
95. Id. at 275. The Court noted that in 1973, the total number of special applicants was 297,
of whom 73 were white; in 1974, 629 applied, of whom 172 were white. Id. at 275, n. 5.
96. Id. at 311–12.
97. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting United States v. Associated Press 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943)). See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
98. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 n. 48 (quoting William G. Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance
of Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY, Sept. 26, 1977 at 9).
99. Id. at 313.
100. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
101. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313–14.
102. Id. at 314.
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2. Justice Souter’s dissent: Gratz v. Bollinger
Gratz v. Bollinger103 dealt with a University of Michigan (hereinafter
“UM”) admissions program that sought to emulate a program similar to
the one Justice Powell described in Bakke.104 The precise issue in this
case centered on what constituted an unconstitutional quota system under
the second prong of strict scrutiny,105 the requirement that the AAP be
narrowly tailored. The Supreme Court in Bakke found that the admissions
program operated as a constitutionally impermissible quota system where
the program reserved a certain number of seats for minority applicants.106
As that case concluded, the compelling interest of diversity could not
justify an admissions program that relied on a racial or ethnic quota
system.107 Unlike Bakke where the school reserved seats for minority
students,108 UM’s admissions program in Gratz provided applicants an
allotted number of points for certain admissions criteria, including race
and ethnicity.109 Because the majority of the Court found that this type of
admissions program operated as a quota-like system insulating minorities
from competition, UM’s admissions program failed to pass constitutional
muster. 110
As noted in Justice Souter’s dissent, the Court contemporaneously
held in Grutter v. Bollinger that an individualized consideration of race is
permissible in achieving diversity “where race is not assigned a
preordained value in all cases.”111 While Grutter provides a floor in the
use of race, Justice Souter noted the ceiling established in Bakke, ruling
out the use of racial quotas or set-asides, “in which race is the sole fact of
eligibility for certain places in a class.”112 Thus, Justice Souter averred

103. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
104. Id. at 257 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
105. Id. at 249–50.
106. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-73, 320.
107. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (noting that the record in Gratz did not
unconstitutionally insulate all non-minority applicants from competition for certain seats and citing
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317)).
108. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 279.
109. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 294–96. The Court noted that Justice Powell’s model program did not
use race as a “decisive” factor. Instead, the program would rather operate in a flexible manner,
considering “all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each
applicant,” emphasizing an individualized analysis of various qualities and experiences that make up
an individual. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307). For example, the admissions program may allot
a talented artist only five points whereas a minority applicant could be awarded an automatic twenty
points. This had the potential to isolate minority individuals from competition in admissions solely
base on his or her ethnicity or race similarly to a quota system. Id. at 293.
110. Id. at 251.
111. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 293 (Souter, J., dissenting).
112. Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. 265).
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that UM’s AAP resembled the Court-approved AAP in Grutter, not the
type condemned in Bakke, because it did not isolate minority applicants
from competition with other non-minority applicants.113
Contrasting the AAP in Gratz with supposedly race neutral
admissions programs, Justice Souter pointed out that certain states
guarantee admission to a fixed percentage of the top students at state
high schools in an arguably failed attempt to achieve diversity.114 The
theory underlying these other admissions programs stems from the fact
that certain schools within a state often have higher percentages of
minorities than others. However, this type of program would not have
achieved desirable results in Michigan because its minority populations
are much smaller.115 Justice Souter argued that this amounted to a
“percentage plan” similar to UM’s, although those “race neutral”
admissions programs did not explicitly state their goal to gain minority
representation through an ostensibly race neutral admissions program.116
He expressed his dismay at this constitutional paradox by stating that
“[e]qual protection cannot become an exercise in which the winners are
the ones who hide the ball.”117
Justice Souter’s dissent in Gratz highlights the importance of a
meaningful review of an applicant.118 Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke
pointed out the fact that in considering diversity factors or qualities
applicants must be placed on the same footing, but this does not mean
according them the same weight.119 The Court failed to explain the
implications of this distinction, but one may speculate that diversity as a
compelling governmental interest permits a type of holistic review where
“plus” factors may be granted to those with attributes that contribute to
diversity, such as membership in a minority race.120

113. Id. (noting that the record in Gratz did not unconstitutionally insulate all non-minority
applicants from competition for certain seats (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317)).
114. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 297–98 (citing Brief Lt. Gen. Julius W. Bector, Jr., et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 13–17, 48–49, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02241)) (noting that a similar program would not work in Michigan because minority populations are
much smaller than in those states with such plans); cf. Brief of Social Scientists Glenn C. Loury, et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02241, 02-516) (comparing these percentage plans to race-conscious AAPs and finding that the latter
are more narrowly tailored than the former in higher education).
115. See supra note 114.
116. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 293, 297-298.
119. See id. at 279, 294 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317
(1978)).
120. See id. at 297–98; cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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C. The Constitutionally Permissible Holistic Approach: Grutter v.
Bollinger
Without discussing its authoritative weight, the Court in Grutter v.
Bollinger121 endorsed Justice Powell’s twenty-five year old opinion in
Bakke and accepted the University of Michigan law school (“UM Law”)
and amici’s assertions that diversity may serve a compelling
governmental interest, and an admissions program which takes into
account race or ethnicity may be narrowly tailored to serve this
interest.122 Like Bakke, the Justices in this case also filed six separate
opinions.123 The Court had to decide whether the use of race as a factor
in admissions by UM Law was unconstitutional pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment.124 With diversity meeting the first prong of strict
scrutiny requiring a compelling governmental interest, a key portion of
the majority’s opinion focused on dispensing with the contention that
UM Law’s admissions program operated as an unconstitutional quotalike system. After applying the second prong of strict scrutiny, the Court
found the law school’s admissions program narrowly tailored because of
its compliance with two notable judicial requirements: time restrictions
on the AAP and absent an undue burden on innocent individuals.125
UM Law’s policy sought individuals with “a strong likelihood of
succeeding in the practice of law and contributing in diverse ways to the
well-being of others” and “a mix of students with varying backgrounds
and experiences who will respect and learn from each other.”126 The
policy focused on academic ability and a flexible assessment of an
applicant’s talents, experiences, and “potential to contribute to the
learning of those around [him or her].”127
Under this policy, admissions officials could look at an applicant’s
grade point average (“GPA”) and Law School Admissions Test
(“LSAT”) score, but they also could consider indicia of academic ability
including the enthusiasm of recommenders, the quality of the applicant’s
undergraduate institution, the level of difficulty of the applicant’s
undergraduate course selection, and the quality of the applicant’s

121. 539 U.S. 306.
122. Id. at 325, 328–29, 334.
123. Justice O’Connor filed the opinion for the Court. Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and Thomas
each filed separate concurring opinions, while Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist filed
separate dissenting opinions.
124. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
125. Id. at 324–25, 328–29, 334, 341–43.
126. Id. at 313–14 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
127. Id. at 315 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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essay.128 An applicant with the highest possible GPA and LSAT score
was not guaranteed admissions nor was an applicant with a low GPA or
LSAT score automatically disqualified.129 Admissions officials were not
restricted in the types of diversity contributions eligible for substantial
weight in the admissions process, recognizing that valuable diversity is
not confined simply to students of different races or ethnic groups.130 But
still, the policy acknowledged that diversity included “racial and ethnic
diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from groups
which have been historically discriminated against, like AfricanAmericans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this
commitment might not be represented in our student body in meaningful
numbers.”131 While affirming the unique ability of a “critical mass” of
underrepresented minority students to contribute to the law school, UM
Law pointed out that its admissions policy acted solely as a guide.132
The Dean of Vanderbilt’s law school testified at trial that such a
“critical mass” negated racial stereotypes because students learn that
minorities have a multitude of viewpoints, not a single minority
perspective.133 Explaining the focus on the stated minorities, the
committee chair who drafted UM Law’s policy testified that the policy
did not seek to remedy past discrimination. Rather, the policy sought
minorities that had not been admitted to UM Law in significant
numbers.134
The Court endorsed Justice Powell’s view in Bakke that “student
body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of
race in university admissions.”135 Identifying several amici who
substantiated the benefits that flow from diversity, the Court found real
benefits, not just hypothetical ones.136 Recognizing the demand from the
marketplace for the benefits of diversity, the Court noted that
[t]hese benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s
increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through
128. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
129. Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
130. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
131. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
132. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But see id. at 378, 381–83 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (averring that a critical mass was a simple guise for racial balancing, which he
found distinct from diversity). The Court noted that “[UM Law’s] concept . . . is defined by
reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce.” Id. at 329.
133. Id. at 319–20.
134. Id. at 319.
135. Id. at 325.
136. Id. at 330–31.
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exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.137

Acknowledging the importance of the benefits of diversity in another
context, the Court turned to our nation’s security and said the following:
What is more, high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the
United States military assert that, ‘[b]ased on [their] decades of
experience,’ a ‘highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is
essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principle mission to
provide national security.’138

Notably, the Court deferred to UM Law’s conclusion that the program
served a compelling interest by seeking to obtain a diverse student
body.139
Applying the second requirement of strict scrutiny, the Court
determined that the admissions program bore the “hallmarks of a
narrowly tailored plan.”140 This finding was supported by the
individualized and flexible nature of the program and the way race and
ethnicity did not insulate minorities, but operated solely as a plus
factor.141 The Court stated the following:
That a race-conscious admissions program does not operate as a quota
does not, by itself, satisfy the requirement of individualized
consideration. When using race as a ‘plus’ factor in university
admissions, a university’s admissions program must remain flexible
enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and
not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining
feature of his or her application. The importance of this individualized
consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is
paramount.142

After noting that the burden on other non-member individuals
favored by the admissions plan was not unduly burdensome, the Court

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 328–29 (citations omitted). The Court’s deference to UM Law raises an important
question: When should the Court defer to Congress’s judgment, and to how much deference is
Congress entitled, under the Equal Protection Clause? Currently, the Court has deferred from
answering these questions. Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228-29 (1995).
140. Id. at 334.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 336–37 (citation omitted).
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turned to the constitutional time limitations on such programs.143 In
Palmore v. Sidoti,144 the Court identified one of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s core purposes as eliminating all governmentally imposed
race discrimination and stressed that UM Law’s admissions program
included periodic review to both assess the need for race-conscious
consideration and determine when sunset provisions may apply.145 It is
not surprising, then, that the Court in Grutter noted that it did not foresee
the use of race-conscious admissions programs in twenty-five years.146
With these limitations, the Court sanctioned the first preferential AAP
justified on the basis of diversity in the educational context,147 and
possibly set the framework for other AAPs justified on the basis of
diversity outside the educational context.
III. BENEFITS OF DIVERSITY OUTSIDE EDUCATION JUSTIFY USING
RACIAL PREFERENCES IN OTHER CONTEXTS
As social science continues to expand its understanding of human
relationships, the evidence becomes stronger that diversity “profoundly
affect[s] both the life experiences of individuals and the way individuals
are treated within society.”148 The breadth of diversity’s benefits is
startling, as gathered by empirical, objective, quantitative, qualitative,
and scientific studies.149 Some of these benefits described and recognized
by the Court are unquantifiable. For example, Justice Powell noted in
Bakke that diversity is imperative to our future leaders.150 Never is it
explained how exposure to diverse races and ethnicities impacts future
leaders or why it is imperative. One could hypothesize that exposure to
diverse races and ethnicities facilitates positive interactions between
racially and ethnically different individuals.151 Since Bakke, evidence has
been proffered to support this hypothesis, as noted by amici in Grutter152
143. Id. at 341–42.
144. 144.Palmore v. Sidoti, 446 U.S. 429 (1984).
145. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341–42 (2003) (quoting Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432).
146. See Id. at 342–43; cf. Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) (arguing that racial diversity is an
unobjectionable compelling governmental interest in all public institutions, citing to the benefits of
diversity as support).
147. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
148. Brief of American Sociological Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at
1, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
149. See supra note 6.
150. See sources cited supra note 5.
151. But see Brief of Reason Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 4, Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (averring that no persuasive evidence
supports the alleged benefits of diversity).
152. See source cited supra note 148.
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and as evidenced by the Justices’ acceptance of the asserted claim.153
Yet, the Court in Grutter did not find it necessary to explain the bases for
some of the claimed benefits, accepting instead UM Law’s arguments,
the Court’s own evaluation of the evidence, and amici’s testaments.154
Diversity has been established as a compelling governmental interest
in the educational context.155 Independent of this, the benefits from
diversity are sought by many important entities and viewed by some as
essential to many aspects of society.156 As discussed below, the Court has
recognized the benefits of diversity as extensive and not solely limited to
the educational context.157 This Section begins by briefly analyzing
different sources and their conclusions on why the benefits of diversity
are substantial and compelling. As a result, the second part of this section
discusses the use of racial preferences, shifting from remedial to
preferential AAPs and defending affirmative action on preferential rather
than remedial grounds.
A. Diversity Outside Education Yields Specific and Important Benefits
Racism is still present in society today.158 Furthermore, studies by
the American Psychological Association have found that many
individuals who claim to be open-minded when it comes to race issues
are in fact racist on an unconscious, but demonstrable, level.159 Evidence
suggests that exposure to other races ameliorates these unconscious
attitudes.160
153. See sources cited supra note 5.
154. See sources cited supra note 7.
155. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342-343.
156. See id. at 330-331 (discussing how the US military and major US businesses seek the
benefits from diversity, including the importance of diversity in national security).
157. See supra note 4.
158. See Brief American Psychological Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
at 3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) [hereinafter APA]. See also
Brief of American Sociological Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 5–13,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter ASA], at 2 (citing Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (stating that “[f]ifty years later, the promise of Brown remains
unfulfilled: race still shapes the lives of our children, and our cities and schools continue to be
segregated to an extraordinary degree. Blacks living in Detroit, New York, and Chicago today are
almost as segregated from whites as were blacks living in South Africa under apartheid”).
159. See APA, supra note 158, at 3; see also ASA, supra note 158 (discussing society’s
hesitation to provide housing and jobs, resulting in further economic disadvantage and stigma); cf.
Brief of Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, at 5–13, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) (noting progress in race
relationship due to the fact that most Americans disagree with governmental racial classifications
(citing Clint Bolick, Blacks and Whites on Common Ground, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 155, 158
(1999); T. Eastland, Ending Affirmative Action: The Case for Colorblind Justice, 164–65 (2d ed.
1997))).
160. See APA, supra note 158, at 3 (citing FAYE J. CROSBY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS DEAD:
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Nonetheless, the Court has noted on several occasions that societal
discrimination alone—assuming that it is not the effect of past
governmental discrimination, or if it is, that the government is unable to
meet its evidentiary burden under strict scrutiny—cannot justify racial
classifications.161 If this is the case, then how can a justification for racial
preferences exist in this context? Justification exists in seeking the vast
benefits of diversity, with its ameliorating effects on the societal
discrimination that becomes less and less bearable as our increasingly
borderless world forces interaction between cultures.162 It seems natural
that one must be culturally educated if one is to interact with those with
differing cultural values or perspectives. In this regard, seeking diversity
outside the classroom setting is simply a continuation or extension of the
educational experience—it seeks to expose and educate us on our
changing world.
When value arguments fail to sway the Court and the public, one
issue carries great weight and rarely ever fails: money. Diversity is “the
critical new human resource requirement for corporations that have
espoused a global business strategy” and “is the most important new
attribute for future effective performance in a global marketplace.”163
Several major international corporations submitted an amicus brief
attesting to the need for businesses to seek diversity, and also noted the
benefits that workplace diversity provides a community.164
LONG LIVE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 225–28 (Yale Univ. Press 2004); see also ASA, supra note 158, at
14 (acknowledging the duty of society and educational institutions to produce leaders and the
essential need for leaders to be exposed to diversity).
161. See source cited supra note 76; see also ASA, supra note 158, at 18–19 (noting that a
prestigious California institution’s mean grade point average was unavailable to minority-attended
schools because those schools did not have AP courses necessary to obtain such GPAs); id. at 5
(pointing out that a consensus exists with social scientists that a majority of our social identity is
defined by our race and ethnicity because of its profound impact in our daily lives).
162. APA, supra note 158, at 3.
163. See id. at 30 (citing T.K. BIKSON & S.A. LAW, GLOBAL PREPAREDNESS AND HUMAN
RESOURCES: COLLEGE AND CORPORATE PERSPECTIVES 24 (Rand Institute on Education and
Training 1994); see also ASA, supra note 158, at 23 (noting that a University of Michigan study
found that LSAT and undergraduate grades bore no relationship to post-grad earnings, community
involvement, or career satisfaction) (citation omitted).
164. See Brief of 3M, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 5–28, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 01-1447) (emphasizing a theme that appears within the Court in
and out of the educational setting that diversity is a pursuit in life not limited to formal educational
institutions, as many of these companies require or provide diversity training to their employees and
provide substantial financial assistance to minority employees in order for them to attain a formal
education); see also Brief of BP America Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, at 1–7,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (recognizing that the necessary
innovation and creativity to be successful depends on the number of diverse perspectives, of which
race and ethnicity play a factor); Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, at 1–32, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 01-1447) (averring that
success in the new business world demands race conscious AAPs); Brief of Exxon Mobil Corp. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, at 2, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-
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And where money fails to sway the public, safety and security often
does. Retired military officials submitted amici briefs attesting to the
absolute need for racial diversity to provide a sufficient level of national
security, acknowledging that no other governmental interest takes
priority.165 These individuals stated that “[b]ased on [their] decades of
experience,” a “highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is
essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide
national security.”166
Even outside of capitalism in a global market place and national
security concerns the need for diversity is apparent. For instance, the
racial and ethnic makeup of our own country is changing rapidly. The
Minority Business Development Agency estimates that by 2050, 47
percent of all Americans will be African American, Latino, Asian, or
Native American.167 This necessitates immediate attention to minority
issues, which will soon be in the majority.168 If minority numbers keep
rising, that does not necessarily mean that non-minority interactions will
increase. According to the American Psychological Association, “[a]
campus could be full of minority students yet still have a segregated
environment without meaningful interactions between different racial
and ethnic groups.”169 When, then, should the Equal Protection Clause

241, 02-516) (expressing its commitment not to maintaining what is done in respect to diversity, but
improving upon it because of its significance); Brief of Amici Curiae Media Companies as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 1–3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02516) (asserting diversity as imperative to their business success and instrumental to the public
through all modes of the Media); Brief of MTV Networks as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
at 1–10, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (stating that diversity is an
absolute for stimulating the marketplace of ideas); Reginald E. Jones, Diversity—Law Firms; Law
Firm Diversity Initiatives, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Feb. 2004, at 28.
165. Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at
5–7, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280, 307 (1981)) (acknowledging another spot area where the arguments for diversity is most
analogous to the arguments in Grutter).
166. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
167. APA, supra note 158, at 23 (quoting Minority Business Development Agency, U.S. Dep’t
of Commerce, Dynamic Diversity: Projected Changes In U.S. Race And Ethnic Composition 1995 to
2050 (1999), at 8) (noting that diversity is a compelling interest not only for formal educational
institutions but also for the nation itself).
168. Minorities suffer from inadequate health coverage and utilization. See APA, supra note
158, at 23–24 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Mental Health: Culture, Race, and
Ethnicity—A Supplement to Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General (2001) at 3; Stanley
Sue, In Search of Cultural Competence in Psychotherapy and Counseling, 53 AM. PSYCHOL. 440
(1998); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (Smedley et al. eds., 2002); 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 7 (Dec. 1995).
169. ASA, supra note 158, at 18; cf. Brief of Center for the Advancement of Capitalism as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 7–8, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241,
02-516) (stating that the only way to combat the problem of racism is individualism, denouncing
diversity as a compelling governmental interest).
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be absolutely blind to race or ethnicity?170
B. Shifting From Remedial to Preferential Affirmative Action Plans
Both remedial and preferential AAPs have been, and arguably
remain, a divisive judicial and societal issue. A brief look at past and
present Supreme Court justices’ commentary may illustrate this while at
the same time forming the basis for the argument for shifting from
remedial to preferential AAPs.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Justice Powell
stated, “[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when
applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of
another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not
equal.”171
As this required a higher level of scrutiny and placed a greater
burden on the University than a lower standard of review, Justice
Marshall responded to Justice Powell’s comment above in his separate
opinion, stating:
For it must be remembered that, during most of the past 200 years, the
Constitution as interpreted by this Court did not prohibit the most
ingenious and pervasive forms of discrimination against the Negro.
Now, when a State acts to remedy the effects of that legacy of
discrimination, I cannot believe that this same Constitution stands as a
barrier.172

Yet the Grutter Court noted that it did not foresee the continued use
of race-conscious AAPs in twenty-five years.173 And under current
Supreme Court Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, race-based
classification is viewed as temporary insofar as it is required to remedy
past discrimination or achieve a compelling governmental interest. One
may find it amazing that after two-hundred years of invidious
discrimination, creating a large disparity between the races, the Court
could possibly foresee the end of preferential AAPs in as little as twentyfive years. In the 1927 case of Buck v. Bell, Justice Holmes remarked that
he could sum up the importance of the Fourteenth Amendment as the
“last resort of Constitutional arguments.”174 Now it is the first resort for
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

ASA, supra note 158, at 29-30.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289–90 (1978).
Id. at 387.
See supra note 146.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting

82

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 21

challenging race-conscious AAPs.
Addressing Justice Marshall’s response, Justice Powell distinguished
between the preferential classification occurring in Bakke and remedial
measures approved by the Court or Congress in other cases, e.g., school
desegregation cases. In Bakke, no legislature or administrative agency
determined that the University had engaged in past discrimination
requiring remedial measures.175 A “[s]tate certainly has a legitimate and
substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the
disabling effects of identified discrimination.”176 Instead of seeking to
remedy a previous constitutional violation, Justice Powell’s opinion in
Bakke viewed diversity as a compelling governmental interest that might
be served by employing race-conscious admissions programs to achieve
a diverse student body.
The Bakke opinion noted that the first class at the University of
California had only three Asians, no Blacks, no Mexican-Americans, and
no American Indians prior to the special admissions program.177 A large
gap in scholastic achievement existed between the minority and general
groups’ credentials.178 At most, Justice Powell highlighted a key issue in
remedial AAPs when he opined that this was “societal discrimination,
[. . .] an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into
the past.”179 He then asserted that justification for racial classification
requires an evidentiary showing “that its purpose or interest is both
constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the
classification is ‘necessary . . . to the accomplishment’ of its purposes or
the safeguarding of its interest.”180 Remedial AAPs, therefore, may be
more akin to societal discrimination than the latter standard.
In the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations, the Court has “never approved a
classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively
victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals.”181 If
such findings have been made, then “the governmental interest in
preferring members of the injured groups at the expense of others is
substantial, since the legal rights of the victims must be vindicated.”182
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
175. Id. at 305.
176. Id. at 307.
177. Id. at 272.
178. Id. at 277.
179. Id. at 307.
180. Id. at 305 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721–22 (1973) (footnotes omitted); see,
e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
181. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (citations omitted).
182. Id.
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Within this scenario, the individual Constitutional protections override
the rights of innocent individuals in order to remedy an earlier
Constitutional violation against a specific group. The Court justified this
result because in such cases the degree of the injury and its prescribed
remedy have been determined by the legislature, judiciary, or
administrative agency and will be continually scrutinized in order to
ensure “the least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for
the benefit.”183 Without this, the government cannot have a compelling
justification for inflicting such harm on innocent parties as well as
wrongdoers,184 which may be comparable to the retributive justice
principle of an eye for an eye. With preferential treatment, all races have
equal value and the use of race-conscious factors or qualities in seeking
diversity aims to benefit all races rather than one race alone. Emphasis is
placed on the individual and his or her contributions as a diverse human
being, including race as a factor. This arguably reaffirms the person’s
identity and esteems the value of embracing one’s identity. It is with this
perspective that diversity, employing race-conscious considerations, has
been asserted as a compelling governmental interest and used to justify
affirmative action.185
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Holmes stated, “[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color
and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is
used.”186 Like a word, an argument is susceptible to fluidity of meaning
and application. This has been shown to be true in two examples
presented here: 1) the argument for judicial deference to Congress in the
wake of a heightened standard of review for all race-conscious AAPs,
and 2) the argument for expanding diversity as a compelling
governmental interest outside the classroom. The former emphasizes the
importance of thinking creatively about affirmative action and how to
effectuate equality where our Court has raised the constitutional standard
of review for federal employment AAPs. The latter seeks to shift from
supporting and defending AAPs on a remedial to a preferential basis.
Judicial recognition of diversity as a compelling governmental

183. Id. at 308.
184. Id. at 309.
185. Is it possible to persuade a conservative judge to a more liberal perspective? One notable
shift is that of Justice Stevens. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236, 242
(quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
186. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
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interest has become more concrete since the 1978 decision of Bakke v.
Regents of the University of California.187 In Grutter v. Bollinger, for
example, the Court affirmed Justice Powell’s non-precedential opinion in
Bakke, which argued for diversity as a compelling governmental interest
in educational admissions programs.188 In Grutter, the Court recognized
the many benefits of diversity in the educational context, which less than
coincidentally results in a spillover effect into society.189 The Court not
only recognized these benefits but also acknowledged the need for them
in several critical sectors outside of the classroom.190
As a result of seeking to further the compelling governmental
interest of diversity, a beneficial by-product occurs: a progressive trend
in alleviating certain societal ills, particularly prejudice, discrimination,
and others.191 While arguments for remedying past governmental
discrimination address the effects of past discrimination, seeking the
benefits of diversity may address these effects to a greater and more
substantial degree. This may be so because genuinely seeking diversity
uses race and ethnicity as one factor, valuing all components of a diverse
people by equating the races and their potential contribution to one
another, and emphasizing the individual above all. Preference for this
type of affirmative action is a preference for equality.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289–90 (1978).
539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003).
Id.; cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 294 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331.
See supra note 160.

